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Introduction 
 
 
 
Following the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR) in March 2010, there was 
a further bout of tension on international financial markets. At its root were Greece’s fiscal 
sustainability problems, which gave rise to a crisis in confidence that particularly affected the 
European countries over which investors had most doubts in respect of public finances and 
growth capacity. 
 
The Spanish markets were among those affected by this episode of tension. This was 
reflected in an increase in risk premia, in stock market declines and in the difficulties banks 
faced in gaining access to international wholesale funding markets, especially in 2010 Q2. 
 
Since late July 2010, accessibility to funding has improved. Contributing to this have been the 
measures approved by the public authorities. These measures include a fiscal consolidation 
plan, structural economic reforms, the restructuring of the savings bank sector and the 
publication of the stress tests for virtually all banks and for all savings banks. Interbank 
markets, especially the repo market, have reopened. And, at the same time, a group of 
Spanish banks, with differences in terms of the amounts placed and the price of such 
placements, has issued debt on wholesale markets. 
 
For this improvement in investor confidence about the Spanish banking sector to firm, the 
restructuring process undertaken in the savings bank sector, involving 40 out of a total of 45 
such institutions (94% of the sector's assets), in different integration processes must prosper. 
In addition, the structural economic reforms and the fiscal consolidation programme must be 
seen through. All these matters are vital to fully regain investor confidence and to restore 
growth to the Spanish economy, without which pressure will persist for the banking sector. 
 
Credit to the resident private sector continues to post negative year-on-year rates of change, 
although these rates are not as sharp as in previous months. It is likely in the coming months 
that credit will continue to trend downwards. This trend is the natural outcome of an ongoing 
household and corporate adjustment, following the increase in their indebtedness during the 
years prior to the crisis. 
 
The growth rate of the resident private sector’s doubtful assets continues to ease, which 
feeds through to likewise more modest increases in doubtful assets ratios. This ratio is higher 
in the most cyclical economic sectors, and in particular in the construction and real estate 
development sector. 
 
The real estate sector is undergoing an adjustment in Spain. Credit to households for house 
purchases continues to show low doubtful assets ratios and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) stands, 
on average, at a relatively low level. Potential problem loans and receivables in the construction 
and real estate development sector, which include sub-standard loans and foreclosed assets, as 
well as doubtful assets, are covered by specific provisions at somewhat over 26%, a percentage 
that rises to 33% if general provisions for business in Spain are included. Banks should convey 
detailed information to the markets about their potential problem loans in the construction and real 
estate development sector, the degree to which such loans are covered and their management 
strategies. At a time of adjustment in the real estate sector, a lack of information may lead to a 
perception that the situation is worse than actual circumstances at each bank warrant. 
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Since the onset of the crisis in summer 2007, wholesale funding markets have functioned with 
serious difficulties. This has necessitated action by the ECB, whose balance sheet has since 
increased. The public debt crisis in the first half of 2010 led to the close of wholesale markets. At 
the height of the tension, banks with excess liquidity deposited funds at the ECB, while those 
who were resorting to the wholesale markets to obtain funding were obliged, since such 
markets had dried up, to apply for liquidity from the central bank to a greater extent. In the case 
of Spanish banks, this translated into an increase in the weight of liquidity applied for from the 
Eurosystem relative to what the Eurosystem provided to the euro area as a whole. 
 
Since July 2010, however, the situation has progressively and substantially improved. The 
interbank markets have gradually opened up and a group of Spanish banks has been able to 
issue significant amounts of debt on the wholesale markets. Further, the debt held by 
Spanish banks is scheduled to mature predominantly in the medium and long term, which 
softens the risk of refinancing. In any event, banks should pay attention to refinancing, 
lengthening maturities insofar as market conditions allow it. 
 
Given the difficulties on wholesale funding markets, commercial banks and savings banks have 
continued to step up retail deposit-raising, albeit at a less sharp pace than in previous quarters. 
 
Spanish deposit institutions' consolidated earnings in the first half of 2010 fell in relation to the 
same period a year earlier. This is firstly because provisioning requirements, which are 
relatively stable in relation to 2009, remain high. And secondly, because the net interest 
margin has fallen compared with the previous year, when it had been the main positive item 
on the income statement. 
 
The narrowing of the net interest margin is due to the contraction in activity and to the petering 
out of the positive effect of interest-rate cuts, which had fed through more quickly to the cost of 
liabilities than to returns on assets. Competition to raise retail deposits translates into a higher 
cost of new deposits, which exerts further pressure on income statements. 
 
In light of the factors exerting downward pressure on earnings, a containment of operating 
costs is apparent. Nonetheless, these efforts should be stepped up both by those banks 
immersed in restructuring and those that are not. In a scenario of narrowing margins and high 
provisioning requirements, cutting operating and structural costs is the most important 
adjustment mechanism available to commercial banks and savings banks. 
 
Banks continue to shore up their solvency, and in particular their core capital, which is 
growing more than the increase observed in capital requirements. This favourable situation in 
terms of solvency, and in particular of that of core capital, places the Spanish banking sector 
in a relatively favourable starting position to undertake the changes recently introduced into 
capital regulations (Basel III). 
 
In sum, the overall situation remains difficult. This is because the economy has not yet 
dispelled the uncertainty surrounding it, because of the exposure to the construction and real 
estate development sector, and due to the situation of the international funding markets, 
despite the improvement witnessed since late July 2010. The banking sector will continue to 
be subject to pressure insofar as investor confidence is not fully restored and growth does 
not resume in the Spanish economy. For these reasons it is vital to entrench the measures 
adopted by the public authorities, in respect both of fiscal consolidation and structural 
economic reforms, and of restructuring processes in the banking sector, the latter being 
strengthened by the notable impulse the amendments to savings bank legislation will provide. 
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1   Macroeconomic risks and financial markets 
 
 
 
Since the publication of the last FSR, there has been a further bout of tension on European 
financial markets. While rooted in Greece’s fiscal sustainability problems, the episode gave 
rise to a crisis in confidence which particularly affected the economies whose budget deficits 
had most deteriorated, or which had built up sizeable imbalances. The turbulence spread to 
stock and foreign exchange markets and to the euro area banking sector. It also affected, 
albeit to a lesser extent, the financial system of other economic areas. Nonetheless, the 
progressive deployment of the measures taken by the European and national authorities and, 
above all, the decision - on the initiative of the Banco de España - to make public the results 
of the stress tests of European credit institutions and subsequently publish them, were 
conducive to helping the markets stabilise as from late June.  
 
The Spanish markets were among those affected by this episode of tension. This was 
reflected in a considerable increase in risk premia, in stock market declines and in limited 
fixed-income securities issues by credit institutions. Indeed, there was a negative net issue in 
Q2. The subsequent improvement has taken the form of a fall in risk premia, a pick-up in 
stock market indices, greater buoyancy on the primary debt market for financial institutions 
and a reduction in the recourse by these institutions to the liquidity provided by the 
Eurosystem.  
 
More recently, international financial market developments have been affected by the doubts 
over the sustainability of the economic recovery in the United States. This followed the 
publication of several adverse macroeconomic indicators, once the effects of the different 
stimulus measures had petered out. As a result, questions relating to macroeconomic 
developments came to the fore, with the financial situation of the public and banking sectors 
playing less of a leading role. Nonetheless, tensions have once again arisen in recent weeks 
in certain euro area sovereign debt markets (Ireland and Portugal), with Spain on this 
occasion not among the countries most affected by this outbreak of turbulence. 
 
Against this background, financing conditions on international markets were seen to tighten 
both for certain public-sector issuers and for the private sector, especially so in the latter case 
for credit institutions (see Charts 1.1.A and 1.1.B). However, a degree of improvement since late 
June has resulted in a higher volume of primary market issues and in a decline in risk premia. 
 
On the government debt markets, there was a decline in the long-term yields on the public 
debt of the main industrialised economies such as the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Germany, which reached historically low levels in early September (see Chart 1.1.C). This 
is partly due to the role of these securities as safe-haven assets and also to the doubts over 
global economic growth, which emerged from late July. In parallel, in the euro area, there was 
an increase in yield spreads over the German Bund (see Chart 1.1.A). 
 
Stock markets were also affected by the greater uncertainty. Indices fell over the course of 
the period under analysis (end-March to early October) while volatility rose, although in recent 
weeks there has been some recovery in prices, accompanied by a reduction in volatility (see 
Chart 1.1.D). This correction in valuations, resulting from the climate of uncertainty and the 
diminished appetite for risk, was partly checked by the favourable course of business 
earnings. Once again, emerging countries’ stock markets performed better than the 
There was a bout of 
instability on European 
markets, which also affected 
Spain. The measures 
applied by European and 
national authorities and the 
publication of the stress 
tests of financial institutions 
have contributed to a 
degree of normalisation.  
More recently, market 
developments have been 
affected by doubts over US 
growth, while there has 
been fresh tension in some 
euro area sovereign debt 
markets. 
The upshot was a tightening 
of financing conditions on 
the markets, though this has 
been partly reversed more 
recently… 
… declining yields on US, 
UK and German 
government debt, a 
widening of spreads within 
the euro area… 
… and slides in stock 
market indices and rises in 
volatility. 
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developed economies, with the exception of Eastern Europe, whose markets trended similarly 
to those in the rest of Europe.  
 
In the first half of 2010, global economic activity continued to strengthen. Global GDP expanded 
at an approximate rate of 5%, somewhat higher than that in the second half of 2009. The pick-
up in activity continued to be led by the emerging countries, particularly the Asian economies 
and Brazil, where growth exceeded 7%. In contrast, in the industrialised economies, growth 
was only slightly above 3%, largely thanks to the scale of the fiscal and monetary support 
received. The inventory cycle and the subsequent recovery in world trade and in gross capital 
formation proved to be key supporting factors in this period, while private consumption 
remained constrained by ongoing deleveraging and weak labour markets in the main 
industrialised economies. Against this backdrop, there were signs as from the end of Q2 of a 
slowdown in activity in the United States and Japan. 
Global economic activity in 
the first half of 2010 
continued to firm, led by the 
emerging economies… 
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In the euro area, economic activity was notably buoyant in 2010 Q2. Supporting factors were 
the dynamism of the world economy and also, in part, certain temporary domestic factors. 
On Eurostat’s initial estimate, euro area GDP increased at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 1%, 
0.7 pp up on the previous quarter. That made for a year-on-year rate of 1.9%, 1.1 pp up on 
the related rate in Q1 (see Chart 1.2.A).  
 
The latest economic indicators show some weakening in the momentum of global activity, 
which may be attributed to the progressive dilution of the fiscal stimuli and to the 
completion of the restocking process initiated from very low levels. This slowdown 
highlights doubts over the capacity of private demand alone to entrench the economic 
recovery, which has contributed to delaying the "exit strategies" for monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, growth forecasts for 2010 and 2011 have held stable or have been revised 
downwards only slightly in some of the main economies, while there have been continuing 
upward revisions in the emerging economies. Despite the fact growth forecasts for 2010 
and 2011 have held stable for the main economies as a whole, the composition of the 
forecasts has altered somewhat, proving more favourable for the euro area at the expense 
of the United States. 
 
In the euro area, economic activity is expected to slow in the short term, compared with the 
figures for Q2, giving rise to a slow and uneven recovery shrouded in still-high uncertainty and 
with some downside risks. This assessment is reflected in the ECB’s September forecasting 
exercise, which envisages GDP growth of between 1.4% and 1.8% in 2010 and 0.5% and 
2.3% in 2011, marking, nonetheless, something of an upward revision on the June forecasts.  
 
Spanish economic activity once again grew - albeit at a weak rate - in quarter-on-quarter 
terms during the first half of 2010, following seven quarters of declines. The specific rate of 
GDP between April and June compared with the previous three months was 0.2%, although 
a slight fall of 0.1% was posted in year-on-year terms (see Chart 1.2.A).  In line with these 
developments, the rate of decline of employment eased. On EPA figures, employment fell by  
… while economic growth in 
the euro area was notably 
dynamic in Q2, partly as a 
result of temporary factors.  
There are signs of global 
economic activity weakening 
in 2010 Q3… 
… and in the euro area, in 
the short run, a slowdown is 
expected, pointing to a 
sluggish and uneven 
recovery shrouded in high 
uncertainty and with certain 
downside risks. 
GDP in Spain grew once 
more in the first two quarters 
of 2010, albeit weakly, and 
this was reflected in an  
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2.5% year-on-year in Q2 and the unemployment rate edged up to 20.1%, set against the 
pick-up in the labour force (see Chart 1.2.B). 
 
The improved macroeconomic setting combined with the weak increase in household and 
corporate debt contributed to some stabilising of these agents’ financial positions; however, 
their lacklustre earnings are hampering any reduction in their debt ratios, which remain at high 
levels (see Charts 1.3.A and 1.3.B). Household net wealth fell off further during the opening 
months of 2010, albeit only slightly so, as a result of the decline in both the real estate and 
the financial components, the latter to a lesser extent.  
 
General government debt continued to slow, although its rate of expansion remains very high 
(19% in July 2010 compared with 29% in December 2009). This strong expansion in raising 
funds, together with the weak pace of GDP, has seen further increases in the debt/GDP ratio 
(56.7% in June against 53.2% at end-2009) and fresh rises in the associated interest burden.  
 
 
easing of the rate of job 
destruction… 
… and some stabilising of 
private-sector financial 
positions, although debt 
ratios remain at high levels. 
General government debt is 
slowing, although it 
continues to grow at a high 
rate, which is reflected in 
increases in debt and the 
interest burden. 
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2   Deposit institutions and other financial market participants 
 
 
 
Following the publication of the last FSR in March 2010, international financial markets have 
been beset by difficulties. These difficulties have been the result of the contagion effect of the 
Greek debt crisis, which increased perception of country risk, especially for those economies 
about which there was more uncertainty in terms of their fiscal sustainability and growth 
capacity. 
 
At the times of greatest stress, financial institutions were unable to resort to wholesale funding 
markets, including the interbank markets. This phenomenon was especially severe in those 
countries affected by the loss of investor confidence. 
 
Since the publication of the results of the stress tests (see Box 2.1) which, in the case of Spain, 
were applied to practically the whole banking system, there have been signs of improvement in 
international funding markets. Spanish institutions have obtained funding on the interbank market, 
at the same time as a group of them, including some medium-sized commercial banks and some 
savings banks, have issued debt on wholesale markets. The foregoing was reflected in a fall in 
August and September in the liquidity that Spanish institutions obtained from the Eurosystem. 
 
The stress tests in Spain are part of a broader set of measures which have contributed to 
improving investor confidence. These measures include the process to restructure the 
savings banks sector within the framework of the FROB —Fund for the Orderly Restructuring 
of the Banking Sector— (see Box 2.2) and are aimed at reducing excess capacity and 
guaranteeing the medium-term profitability of participants by strengthening their solvency. 
The measures adopted also include amendments to the Savings Banks Law (see Chapter 3) 
which provide these institutions with new instruments that will permit them to issue top quality 
capital, at the same time as they subject themselves to greater market discipline and 
introduce further improvements to how they are managed. Structural reforms and the fiscal 
consolidation programme have also made a positive contribution. 
 
Building upon the improvement in investor confidence in the Spanish banking sector seen 
since end-July requires consolidating the restructuring processes under way in the savings 
bank sector. It also requires completion of the structural economic reforms and the fiscal 
consolidation process. All of the foregoing is necessary for a full recovery of international 
investor confidence and for the Spanish economy to return once again to a growth path. Until 
these conditions prevail, the pressure on the banking sector will persist. 
 
The total consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions grew in June 2010 at a rate of 
3% with respect to the same period of the previous year (see Table 2.1). This increase is 
similar to that already seen in December 2009, but is considerably lower than that posted in 
previous years (10.4% in June 2009 and 8.1% in June 2008). 
 
The low rate of increase in assets is explained essentially by the performance of financing to 
the private sector (credit plus fixed income) and, in particular, by that of credit to the resident 
private sector in Spain which, as analysed below, posted a negative rate of change of 0.9% in 
June 2010. This performance of credit is explained by the weakness of the real economy, 
involving lower demand from corporations and households, and the deteriorating credit 
quality of borrowers, prompting institutions to be more cautious in their lending. It is also  
2.1 Deposit institutions 
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS 
 
Financial markets were 
beset by difficulties… 
… which tended to ease 
following the publication of 
the stress tests. 
In Spain, the stress tests are 
part of an important process 
to restructure the banking 
sector, especially savings 
banks. 
Building upon the 
improvement seen in 
investor confidence in the 
Spanish banking sector 
involves pressing ahead with 
the restructuring process, 
fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms. 
Credit to the resident private 
sector continues to post 
negative year-on-year rates 
of change. 
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STRESS TESTS FOR SPANISH BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS BOX 2.1. 
 
On 23 July the results of the 2010-2011 EU-wide stress tests were 
published. The exercise was coordinated by the Committee of 
European Bank Supervisors (CEBS) in collaboration with the ECB, 
and involved various European supervisory and policy institutions. 
The Banco de España, which had previously announced its intention 
to conduct and publish the results of the stress tests of Spanish 
banks, resolutely supported conducting the joint exercise EU-wide, 
since in this way greater transparency and comparability was 
ensured. Precisely with the aim of maximising such transparency, the 
Banco de España decided that the exercise in our country should 
be as extensive as possible, as regards both the number of 
institutions and the information provided1.  
 
As to the participating institutions, it was agreed at the European level that 
they should represent at least 50% of the national banking sector. In 
Spain's case, 27 institutions (all listed banks and all the savings banks 
resulting from the reorganisation process under way) were included, 
making for coverage of more than 90% of the system. 
 
The other differentiating factor of the stress tests undertaken in Spain 
was the degree of additional detail. This included a breakdown of 
banking books (with particular attention to credit for real estate 
activities), and the public aid earmarked before the conducting of 
the stress tests.  
 
The starting point for conducting the stress tests was end-2009. 
Thereafter, stressed impairment losses were calculated for the two-
year period 2010-2011 under the two scenarios designed for the 
European exercise: the benchmark scenario and the adverse 
scenario. 
 
Under the stressed adverse scenario, the pressure took the form 
of a decline in GDP in 2010-2011 of 2.6 pp, on top of the strong 
economic contraction in Spain in 2009 (-3,6%). This assumption lies 
outside the forecasting ranges of the various national and 
international agencies and of private analysts. The level of capital 
agreed by Ecofin to determine whether institutions would pass the 
tests was set as a tier 1 capital ratio of 6%, 50% higher than the 
legally required minimum. 
 
As part of the information presented by the Banco de España both 
on a bank-by-bank basis and for different groups, a breakdown was 
given of the gross hypothetical impairment losses on the main 
banking book, detailing the items that absorb these losses until 
arriving at the final impact on tier 1 capital. For the aggregate of the 
system as a whole under the stressed adverse scenario, the 
main results, which show the soundness of the Spanish 
banking sector, are summarised below:  
 
 The hypothetical impairment losses that would arise in 
2010 and 2011 would amount to €207,473 million, 7.3% 
of total assets (9.5% for savings banks). 
 
 
1. The results of the stress tests for the Spanish banking sector can be viewed 
at http://www.bde.es/prensa/test_cebs/resultados_cebse.htm. 
The most significant source of these impairment losses 
was in the banking book, for an amount of €173,619 
million (i.e. 84% of total impairment losses) and, hereunder, 
those in the real estate development portfolio (€76,012 
million, 44% of total impairment losses due to credit risk). 
 
 The provisions set aside would enable 34% of these 
impairment losses to be absorbed, while income-
generating capacity would absorb a further 48% (29% at 
savings banks), even assuming a severe reduction in 
average net operating income compared with 2009. 
 
 Tier 1 capital as at December 2009 stood at €181,865 million 
for the entire banking sector, representing a tier 1 ratio of 9.5% 
(9.2% for savings banks). Stressed tier 1 capital as at 
December 2011 would fall to €148,339 million (a ratio of 7.7%) 
for the entire banking sector and to €45,024 million (a ratio of 
5.5%) for savings banks. 
 
 Under the stressed adverse scenario, only four savings 
banks failed to reach the minimum level of 6%. This 
situation does not entail a current or expected failure by 
these four institutions to comply with the minimum legal 
capital requirement, since it reflects an extreme situation, in 
the face of highly stressed assumptions that are very 
unlikely to occur. However, these institutions must submit 
an additional capitalisation plan, not out of legal necessity, 
but to obtain greater room for manoeuvre and to dispel 
any doubts about their future. Depending on the market 
situation, funds will be raised from private sources or from 
additional aid from the FROB, which has been extended to 
31.12.2010 in this connection. 
 
 The total support calculated as necessary so that all 
institutions might stand above the 6% tier 1 capital 
threshold as at December 2011 under the adverse 
scenario (including the support received by the two savings 
banks seized by the Banco de España and by those that 
requested aid for integration, and the estimated additional 
aid) would amount to €16,193 millions, of which the FROB 
and the DGF had already previously provided or committed 
€14,358 million. 
 
The stress tests should be seen as part of the far-reaching reform 
of the Spanish financial system, centred on savings banks, on 
which institutions have been working for more than two years. Key 
elements of this reform are the integration of savings banks, the 
recapitalisation of many of them and the new savings bank 
legislation, which places them on an equal footing with banks in 
respect of both the possibility of issuing top-quality capital and 
making their governing bodies more professional. The undertaking of 
these tests sought to dispel doubts over the Spanish banking 
system, doubts largely centred on the situation of savings banks and 
on their exposure to the real estate sector.  
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accounted for by the banks' reliance on wholesale funding markets which experienced 
considerable strain in 2010 Q2. Aside from these considerations, the negative rates of 
change in credit reflect a natural adjustment process by households and corporations 
following some years of a sharp increase in their indebtedness. 
 
Sluggish credit to the private sector contrasts with buoyant financing (credit plus fixed 
income) to general government (21% in June 2010), although its growth rate eased 
noticeably, from 42% in December 2009. 
 
The total doubtful assets at consolidated level continued to post positive rates of change 
(17%), although these rates are significantly lower than those recorded throughout 2009 and 
2008 (48% in December 2009, 171% in June 2009 and 239% in December 2008). The 
moderation of the rate of increase of doubtful assets resulted in a lower growth rate of the 
total doubtful assets ratio at consolidated level which, nonetheless, continued to rise (by 
50 bp from June 2009 to 3.78% in June 2010). 
 
The first half of 2010 and, particularly, 2010 Q2, were marked by severe strains in wholesale 
funding markets, both in money markets and primary markets. These strains arose from the 
Greek public debt crisis and its contagion effect in terms of market perception of the fiscal 
sustainability of other euro area countries and of the euro area as a whole. This uncertainty, 
which had a negative effect on the European banking sector and, in particular, on countries 
perceived by investors as having the largest fiscal and growth problems, abated for Spain in 
August and September, partly due to the publication of the stress tests. 
 
In such a complex setting, Spanish banks, to a varying degree, had greater recourse to the 
Eurosystem's liquidity, which was reflected in a sharp rise in net lending (the funds received in 
liquidity providing operations minus those deposited in liquidity absorbing operations). Their use 
of this liquidity was nonetheless reduced in August (–16% in relation to July 2010) and in 
September (–11% in relation to August 2010) and represented 2.8% of the deposit institutions' 
consolidated balance sheet, on the basis of average data for August, and 2.5% on the basis of 
average data for September, in line with relatively low values of 2% observed in previous 
quarters. 
  
The difficulties on international markets were also observed on primary markets, which was 
reflected in the stagnation of subordinate debt issuance in June 2010 in relation to June 2009 
and in the negative year-on-year rate of change in June 2010 (–9%) for the issuance of 
marketable securities. However, a group of Spanish deposit institutions has returned to 
primary markets since end-July. 
 
As for retail funding, Spanish deposit institutions have stepped up deposit-taking, although 
the rate of increase in this variable is less sharp than in previous quarters (5% year-on-year in 
June 2010, compared with 6% in December 2009 and 12% in June 2009). 
 
As in December 2009, deposit institutions have strengthened their own funds. After growing 
at a rate of 4% in June 2010 in relation to June 2009, they represent 5.6% of the 
consolidated balance sheet (5.5% in June 2009). 
 
Business abroad represented 25.9% of total consolidated assets in June 2010 (23.5% in 
June 2009). Spanish banks' business abroad is undertaken through subsidiaries which are 
financially independent and focus their activity, as in the case of their parents in Spain, on 
The rate of increase of 
doubtful assets ratios has 
eased. 
Wholesale funding markets 
experienced strains, 
particularly in 2010 Q2… 
… which eased as reflected 
by the fall in Spanish banks' 
use of the Eurosystem's 
liquidity… 
… and the possibility of new 
fixed-income securities 
issuance from end-July. 
Retail deposits continued to 
grow, but less sharply than 
in 2009. 
Spanish banks continued to 
strengthen their own funds. 
The risks arising from 
business abroad,  
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THE SPANISH BANKING RESTRUCTURING PROCESS. SAVINGS BANKS 
 
       BOX 2.2 
 
More than three years have elapsed since the start of the international 
economic and financial crisis. Most Spanish deposit institutions 
evidenced then and now considerable strength, as demonstrated by 
the results of the EU-wide stress tests last July. However, the 
Spanish banking sector, and most especially savings banks, were 
prone to a series of weaknesses, the solution to which necessarily 
involved the orderly restructuring of our financial system through 
integration processes:  
 
 Capacity in the sector had been attuned to a period of 
excessive growth marked by very high business volumes. 
The fall in the demand for financial services highlighted 
excess capacity, which needs to be absorbed. 
 
 With significant differences from one institution to another, 
this growth was underpinned by the real estate and 
construction sector, and in many cases it was funded on the 
wholesale markets. The increase in bad debts and greater 
difficulties in gaining access to funding exerted pressure on 
institutions' income statements, making the generation of 
synergies vital.  
 
 Savings banks faced added difficulties in increasing their 
capital through means other than retaining profits, given 
the lack of attractiveness of their non-voting equity 
units.  
 
Against this background, the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring 
of the Banking Sector (FROB) was set up pursuant to Royal 
Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009. Its main aim was to 
support integration processes between viable institutions with a 
view to enhancing their efficiency in the medium term by 
strengthening their capital, thereby promoting the improved 
competitiveness and credibility of the financial system. The FROB 
also has a second aim, namely to provide for crisis resolution at 
non-viable institutions when a solution cannot be reached under 
the traditional framework based on the deposit guarantee funds 
(DGF). In short, the FROB contributes on one hand to 
redimensioning and recapitalising the Spanish banking system, 
and on the other it complements the capacity of the DGF to 
resolve individual crises. In scarcely a year since the Fund’s 
design, a far-reaching reorganisation of the banking sector has 
taken place.  
 
Turning to the savings banks, 40 out of a total of 45 of them are 
participating in some type of integration process. These 40 institutions, 
which account for 94% of the sector in terms of assets, are immersed 
in 13 integration processes based on two different legal structures 
(mergers or institutional protection systems). Of these 13 processes, 
eight have requested financial support from the FROB for a total 
amount of €10,581 million. Practically in its entirety, this aid has taken 
(or will take) the form of the acquisition of preference shares 
redeemable within five years (extendable under certain circumstances 
to seven years) and with a minimum annual remuneration of 7.75%. 
These plans include reductions in the number of branches and in staff 
of 10%-30% and 11%-27%, respectively. From 45 institutions with an 
average total assets of €28,504 million, the sector is now made up of 
18 institutions (or groups of institutions) with average assets of €71,260 
million.  
 
On two occasions, the Banco de España adopted the exceptional 
measures envisaged for circumstances in which the institutions’ viability 
might be jeopardised. On 29 March 2009, under the traditional 
framework for action of the DGF, it was resolved to replace the 
directors of Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM) by others designated by 
the Banco de España. With the restructuring process concluded, 
CCM’s banking business has finally been integrated into the Cajastur 
group. The financial aid from the DGF to CCM, after a dation of assets 
in payment by the latter, amounts to €596 million relating to losses 
(which may vary depending on the results that the asset divestment 
plan yields), in addition to an asset protection scheme (APS) for €2,475 
million relating to specific loans and receivables assigned to the 
Cajastur group. On 21 May 2010 it was resolved to replace the 
directors of CajaSur, with the FROB being appointed as provisional 
administrator. The plan drawn up by the Steering Committee of the 
FROB envisages the full assignment of assets and liabilities to Bilbao 
Bizkaia Kutxa and an APS for a maximum total of €392 million.  
 
The restructuring process has not been confined to savings banks 
but is also affecting, to a lesser extent, other types of institutions 
such as credit cooperatives and commercial banks, although none 
have requested support from the FROB. To properly assess the 
total resources earmarked to address losses, in addition to the 
amounts committed by the FROB and the DGF, the write-downs 
made and charged to income in this period by institutions and the 
amounts drawn down on general provisions (€41,900 million and 
€18,200 million, respectively) must be added.      
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retail and commercial banking. Banks have diversified by geographical area by increasing 
their presence, which was initially focused on Latin America, in other EU countries and, to a 
lesser degree, in the United States. In the current setting, Spanish banks' business abroad 
has brought advantages associated with the geographical diversification of activity. 
 
Credit to the private sector resident in Spain continued to post negative year-on-year 
rates of change (see Chart 2.1.A), although they were more moderate than in previous 
months (–0.9% in June 2010 compared with –2.1% in March 2010 and –2% in December 
2009). The latest available data, for August 2010, showed similar year-on-year rates of 
change to those in June (–0.8%). 
 
Credit fell less steeply in June 2010 in relation to the previous year, which can be seen in all 
sectors of activity (see Chart 2.1.A), although differences remain. Within household credit 
(which grew in total by 0.9% in June 2010), lending for house purchase grew at a rate of 
around 1% (0.7% in December). Other household financing continued to post a negative 
year-on-year growth rate (–1.3% in June 2010), although its rate of decline has moderated 
gradually since June 2009. 
 
As for corporations, the rates of change are negative for lending to construction and real 
estate development firms (–3.4%) and for other corporations (–1% in June 2010). In both 
cases these negative changes are less sharp than in March 2010 and in December 2009 (see 
Chart 2.1.A). 
 
The ongoing uncertainty about the performance of the real economy and about wholesale 
funding markets, despite the signs of recovery in August and September, point to credit 
continuing to perform adversely in coming months. This performance of credit, in any event, 
reflects a natural adjustment process by households and corporations, following the sharp 
undertaken through 
financially independent 
subsidiaries, remained 
contained. 
Credit to the resident private 
sector continued to post 
negative, albeit more 
moderate, year-on-year 
rates of change. 
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rise in their indebtedness in the past. From a more medium-term perspective, and in view of how 
credit has performed in Spain and in the euro area in the last decade (see Chart 2.1.B), it will 
foreseeably in Spain follow a more similar pattern to that observed for the euro area as a whole. 
 
The doubtful assets of the resident private sector in Spain continued to post positive 
year-on-year rates of change (16.5% in June 2010, 15.3% in July 2010 and 13.8% in August 
2010), although they were less marked than in previous months. Thus, the year-on-year rate 
of change in the volume of doubtful assets has gradually slowed since mid-2009 and 
currently stands at similar levels to those of April 2008 (see Chart 2.2.A). 
 
Changes in credit and the growth of doubtful assets explain the persistent growth trend in the 
doubtful assets ratio of the resident private sector in Spain (5.3% in June 2010, 
compared with 4.98% in December 2009 and 4.5% a year earlier). Nevertheless, the rate of 
increase in this ratio has gradually been lower (the doubtful assets ratio was 5.4% in July 
2010 and 5.6% in August 2010). This can be seen for various sectors of activity although the 
ratios are higher and have increased more sharply in those sectors which behave more 
cyclically (see Chart 2.2.B). 
 
Significant differences remain in household credit between credit for house purchase and 
other credit, which recorded doubtful assets ratios of 2.5% and 6.1%, respectively, in June 
2010 (see Chart 2.2.B). 
 
The lower doubtful assets ratio of housing loans has not only been seen during this period of 
expansion of doubtful assets but also in previous recessions in Spain. This is explained by the 
type of business in which Spanish banks engage (traditional retail banking), by the structural 
characteristics of the housing market in Spain (high weight of owner-occupied housing) and by 
existing specific regulations (guarantees supplementing for the mortgaged asset). Furthermore, 
lending for house purchase involves collateral which limits potential losses for banks, all the 
process by households and 
corporations. 
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slow...  
… which fed through to the 
doubtful assets ratios for the 
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more so considering that for Spanish banks the loan to value ratio (LTV) is 62% in the retail 
mortgage portfolio (see Chart 2.3.A). This situation is relatively homogeneous across deposit 
institutions (see Chart 2.3.B), the highest average LTV ratio stands at approximately 70%, and 
the banks are distributed relatively uniformly around the average level. 
 
The stress tests published in July 2010 (see Box 2.1) show that the hypothetical losses in the 
extreme scenario, which has a low probability of occurring, are lower than those in other 
portfolios, except for that of financial institutions (see Chart 2.3.C). This was the case even 
though an extreme macroeconomic scenario, including highly substantial hypothetical falls in 
house prices, was considered (see Chart 2.3.D). 
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As for credit granted to non-financial corporations, notable differences persist between the 
doubtful assets ratio for lending to construction and real estate development firms (10.9% in 
June 2010), and that for lending to other business activities (4.3% in June 2010, see Chart 
2.2.B). 
 
Construction and real estate development lending has a very pronounced cyclical profile. For 
this reason, in recessions the related doubtful assets ratio increases significantly above 
average. At present, the real estate development sector is undergoing a notable adjustment 
process. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the doubtful assets ratio of this sector, despite 
the moderation of its rate of increase, will continue to rise in coming quarters. The stress tests 
considered a highly unlikely very adverse scenario, which included substantially notable 
declines in the prices of the collateral typically associated with this type of financing (see Chart 
2.3.D). The results of the tests showed that this type of lending recorded the highest 
hypothetical losses (see Chart 2.3.C). 
 
The doubtful assets ratio is 
higher for construction and 
real estate development 
loans… 
… as seen in previous crises 
(1993). The stress tests 
reflect the higher 
hypothetical losses 
associated with this activity. 
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The doubtful assets ratio compares doubtful assets1 with the volume of credit extended. Similarly, 
Banco de España accounting regulations also require that certain operations be classified in the 
sub-standard category (see Chart 2.4.A), if generic weaknesses associated with a sector or group 
are observed or if weaknesses are apparent in certain operations, even if these operations do not 
qualify individually for classification as doubtful or write-off. This classification involves the obligation 
to make specific provisions. These provisions increased and in June 2010 represented 13.5% of 
the sub-standard assets associated with construction and real estate development activities, 
compared with 12.9% in December 2009 (see Charts 2.4.B and 2.4.C). 
 
Most of the exposures to the construction and real estate development sector, due to their nature, 
have various types of collateral. Faced with the deteriorating credit quality of firms in this sector, 
deposit institutions have actively managed this collateral through foreclosures and dations in 
payment, limiting the negative impact of this impairment on borrowers' credit quality. The Banco 
de España supervises these operations so that they do not lead to a delay in the recognition of 
losses and, in fact, has modified its guidelines for estimating impairment, which are included in 
accounting regulations, in order to make them sounder. This reform recognises the value of the 
collateral (which is subject to certain haircuts), accelerates the need to record a provision for the 
part of the loan not covered by the value of the guarantee (100% coverage in one year) and 
establishes precise requirements for the specific provisions for foreclosed assets (see Box 2.3). 
The Banco de España already required the recording of specific provisions for foreclosed assets 
since institutions should not accumulate real estate assets indefinitely on their balance sheets. 
 
Since December 2008, as a result of these collateral management practices, foreclosed 
assets and dations in payment have grown. In June 2010 they amounted to €70 billion (see 
Charts 2.4.A and 2.4.C). The specific provisions recorded for these exposures represented 
23.7%, compared with 21.8% in December 2009 (see Charts 2.4.B and 2.4.C). 
 
The potentially troubled exposure of the banking sector to construction and real estate 
development, as defined in the last FSR (see Box 2.3), includes doubtful assets, sub-
standard loans, foreclosures and loan write-offs. It amounted to €181 billion in June 2010 
(€166 billion in December 2009). 
 
The specific provisions available for covering the losses associated with these assets have 
increased commensurately with such assets. This is reflected in the stability of the coverage 
ratios (see Chart 2.4.B), which amounted to 26.6% for the potentially troubled exposure 
aggregate, 1 pp higher than in December 2009. If, in addition to the specific provisions, the 
general provisions set aside for business in Spain are taken into account, the coverage ratio 
would rise to 33% (see Chart 2.4.C). 
 
There are differences in banks' exposure to the construction and real estate development 
sector and, consequently, in their potentially troubled loans and the related provisions. The 
detailed information published in the stress tests has contributed to improving investor 
confidence in the Spanish banking sector. At a time of strong adjustment of the real estate 
sector, a lack of information may give rise to a perception of the banks' situation which is 
worse than it actually is. For this reason, it would be appropriate for Spanish banks to make 
more efforts to inform market participants about the situation of their potentially troubled 
exposure to the construction and real estate development sector, the provisions they have 
set aside and their strategic decisions to tackle any problems that might exist. 
 
1. For the purposes of this ratio, loans in which some instalment has not been paid for a period of more than 90 days, or 
for which banks have reasonable doubts as to total repayment under the terms agreed when they were granted. 
In credit to the construction 
and real estate development 
sector both doubtful and 
foreclosed assets have 
grown… 
…in which connection, as in 
the case of sub-standard 
loans, the Banco de España 
requires specific provisions 
be made. 
The potentially troubled 
exposure to the construction 
and real estate development 
sector (doubtful assets, sub-
standard loans, foreclosures 
and write-offs)… 
… entailed coverage with 
specific provisions of 26.6%. 
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA CIRCULAR (CBE) 3/2010 OF 29 JUNE 2010: 
REVISION OF ANNEX IX OF CBE 4/2004 
 
       BOX 2.3 
 
The experience gained in the analysis and coverage of risk on 
the basis of Annex IX advised amending certain aspects 
regarding both credit policies and the methodologies for 
estimating asset impairment.  
 
CBE 4/2004 marked a far-reaching change in that it 
incorporated the international financial reporting standards 
adopted by the European Union into the accounting 
regulations governing Spanish credit institutions. However, 
this did not alter the practice of offering guidelines on 
covering the most significant banking risks. 
 
The revision approved by the Banco de España refined the 
methodology for estimating asset impairment to take into 
account the conditions under which credit risk currently 
develops and to reflect appropriately actual asset impairment 
and its transmission to the market through the financial data 
published by banks. The revision was three-pronged:  
- Credit policies, methods and procedures; 
- Estimation of impairment losses on debt instruments 
classified as doubtful; and  
- Estimation of real estate assets received in payment of 
debt. 
 
Credit policies, methods and procedures 
 
The amendment addresses common problems often found in 
the reviews of supervised institutions’ financial information, 
such as insufficient generation of cash flow by borrowers and 
excessive reliance on the collateral provided, along with rather 
unrealistic financial restructuring plans. 
 
The revision of policies includes recommendations that help 
prevent the emergence of problems in credit portfolios. These 
recommendations are deemed essential for promoting  
prudent and robust credit risk management. They include the 
need to take all due caution combined with professional 
judgment in enlisting external professional services in the risk 
management process; the need to set limits on the financing 
of real estate projects, including a maximum ceiling of 50% 
on lending for the acquisition of land; and the need for a debt 
rescheduling policy that includes at least minimum 
requirements regarding years of experience with the borrower 
and a sufficiently broad limit on the frequency of 
reschedulings.  
 
Estimation of impairment losses on debt instruments 
classified as doubtful 
 
The recognition of the estimated value of the real estate 
collateral using different schedules proved partial and gave 
rise to incongruencies, including the lack of coverage of 
potential losses over long periods of time and the obligation 
to set aside 100% provisions for loans despite the existence 
of collateral that would lessen the final loss.  
 
The revision in respect of estimation, without overlooking past 
experience, entails a change in focus since the collateral 
provided is considered directly. First, a single schedule is 
generally established for estimating impairment for all classes 
of transactions, so that the portion not collateralised by 
personal and real estate property is assimilated to an 
unsecured loan. 
 
Further, the valuation of claims on real estate collateral 
received is referenced to the lower of cost and appraised 
value. Haircuts are applied to this valuation to reflect both the 
heterogeneity of the collateral and the different possibilities of 
conversion into liquidity. These haircuts are 20% for the 
borrower’s principal dwelling, 30% for rural land and multi-
purpose offices, and commercial and industrial premises, 
40% for other finished housing and 50% for developable land 
parcels and building plots.  
 
In turn, for entities with sufficient past experience in the 
management of personal property acting as collateral for credit 
transactions, the revision included the possibility of this being 
used in estimations of losses on this type of transaction, taking 
into consideration the existence of secondary markets with 
readily observable prices underpinning both the valuation and 
the ease of conversion into liquidity. 
Real estate assets received in payment of debt 
 
Finally, the different practices used by entities to settle credit 
transactions through the acquisition of real estate assets have 
been unified. The market situation of some of these assets 
occasionally hampers the recovery of liquidity within the 
desired terms; accordingly, on the basis of the experience 
gained in past years, a comprehensive methodology has 
been incorporated to avoid dilatory practices in recognising 
the impairment of these types of assets. The methodology 
establishes, as a general rule, a minimum impairment of 10% 
of the assets acquired, which, depending on the time they 
remain on the balance sheet, could increase to 20% or 30% if 
the time elapsed is more than one or two years, respectively. 
 
Impact  
 
The revision of Annex IX will not be applied retrospectively, 
and its initial quantitative impact will be recognised in the 
results for 2010 Q3. 
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There has been a further bout of tension on financial markets which was particularly acute 
in 2010 Q2. It stemmed from the loss of investor confidence due to Greece's fiscal 
sustainability problems (see Chapter 1) and affected on the primary markets and the 
interbank market, as shown by the EONIA trading volume (see Chart 2.5.A). Since the 
publication of the stress tests, the interbank market and especially the repo market have 
opened up again and a group of Spanish deposit institutions have accessed the wholesale 
markets, although the volumes and prices of the financing obtained have varied. This is 
reflected in the reduction of liquidity obtained from the Eurosystem in August and September. 
 
Since the outbreak of the crisis in summer 2007, funding markets have experienced notable 
malfunctioning. This has compelled the ECB to intervene in the markets by providing liquidity 
and accepting any surplus in the form of deposits from banks. This action of the ECB is 
shown in the growth path followed by the outstanding amount of refinancing provided 
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through Eurosystem tenders, which until the end of 2010 Q1 increased for most countries in 
the euro area (see Chart 2.5.B) 
 
At the height of the sovereign debt crisis, in 2010 Q2, there was no access to the interbank 
and primary funding markets. Banks with surplus liquidity deposited it with the ECB. 
Conversely the banks that turned to the wholesale markets for funding requested liquidity 
from the Eurosystem. Spanish banks are in the latter group, which was reflected (see Chart 
2.5.C) in the gross lending requested by Spanish banks which, as a percentage of the total 
for the euro area, amounted to 22.7% in July (29.1% in terms of net lending, that is, the 
difference between the liquidity injected and the funds deposited in liquidity absorbing 
operations). 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING HOUSES 
 
       BOX 2.4 
 
In 2010 Q2, the international funding markets closed for banks as a 
result of sovereign debt developments. In Spain's case, the 
perception of double risk (from the country of origin of the credit 
institution and from the country of origin of the issuer of the collateral, 
in this case Spanish public debt) practically led to the disappearance 
of repo operations with non-resident institutions using Spanish public 
debt as collateral. That forced Spanish banks to resort to the 
Eurosystem to raise funds. 
 
However, in recent months the situation has improved significantly. 
One of the factors contributing to this recovery is the access by 
Spanish institutions to the central counterparty clearing houses 
(CCP). Non-resident entities reduce their risk with Spanish institutions 
in Spanish public debt repos through the intermediation of a CCP, 
which assumes the counterparty risk. That enables them to once 
again undertake or even increase the foregoing repo operations 
without the above-mentioned double risk. Since July 2010 a larger 
number of Spanish institutions has obtained funding from non-
resident institutions, either as members or through intermediaries, 
through operations backed by the main European fixed-income CCP: 
the UK London Clearing House (LCH) and the German Eurex Repo. 
Since August Spanish public debt securities have been accepted by 
LCH as collateral for repos. Although there was already a CCP in 
Spain to guarantee fixed-income securities operations, namely  
Meffclear, the absence of non-resident institutions restricted its use.  
 
The main function of a CCP is to intermediate securities clearing and 
settlement processes, essentially in contract novation and managing 
the risk arising from intermediation by means of demanding collateral. 
The novation agreement leads to the annulment of the participants' 
obligations in the clearing house in favour of the CCP itself, which 
assumes these obligations and then acts as a counterparty both to 
the buyer and to the seller, thereby ensuring operations are 
successfully completed. That is to say, the presence of a CCP frees 
the participating institutions from counterparty risk. Moreover, the use 
of a CCP has other advantages for banks, as it makes the use of 
capital more efficient and facilitates the obtaining of short-term 
funding at a cost similar to that signalled by interbank market rates. 
…which resulted in larger 
requests for liquidity from 
the Eurosystem, especially 
from banks in the countries 
hit by the bout of tension. 
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Recourse to Eurosystem liquidity continued to represent a small percentage of the 
consolidated balance sheet of Spanish banks (2.5% in September 2010) and, in any event, 
the difficult situation in 2010 Q2 has eased significantly as funding markets have opened up 
again. Consequently, Spanish banks' use of Eurosystem liquidity has fallen in recent months 
(see Chart 2.5.C). Thus, Spanish banks' gross lending as a percentage of total Eurosystem 
lending fell to 21.2% on average in August (25.6% in terms of net lending) and to 19.1% on 
average in September (21.8% in terms of net lending). This gradual decline continued 
throughout September and reached 13.9% at the end of that month (18.9% in terms of net 
lending). 
 
The improvement in funding markets is perceptible on the repo market, which began to open 
up again for banks. The main European clearing houses, by accepting Spanish government 
debt securities as eligible collateral in repo operations, have also contributed to this, since in 
this way the counterparty risk is eliminated through the interposition of the clearing house (see 
Box 2.4). 
 
The primary markets have also opened up. Since end-July an improvement has been seen in 
the ability of Spanish banks to access these markets, not only the biggest banks but also 
some medium-sized commercial banks and savings banks. This occurred on the mortgage 
This situation was reversed 
for Spanish banks in August 
and September… 
… as interbank funding 
began to be available 
again… 
… and several Spanish 
banks accessed primary 
markets from end-July. 
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covered bond market, where since July several Spanish banks have issued an overall amount 
of around €12.5 billion, and on the bonds and notes market, where approximately €16 billion 
have been issued since the same date.  
 
Issues in recent months, albeit different, have been placed with high spreads in relation to the 
usual spreads seen in the past. The relationship between the sovereign debt spread and the 
risk premium demanded by markets from banks' issues, implies that the former tends to act 
as a floor. For Spanish banks this means higher rates on their issues in comparison with 
those assumed by institutions in countries where sovereign spreads have remained more 
moderate, irrespective of the specific situation of each bank. 
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The bulk of the maturities on the outstanding amount of Spanish banks' medium and long-
term debt is concentrated at the longer term (see Chart 2.5.D). This maturity structure 
mitigates the refinancing risk. This applies, even if asset securitisations are excluded. The 
securitised assets mature at very long term. Consequently, when they are excluded, as is the 
case in Chart 2.5.D, the maturities of the outstanding amount (excluding securitisations) tend 
to be concentrated, comparatively, at the shorter term. However, the reason for excluding the 
securitisations is that in the Spanish case there is no refinancing risk associated with them 
since the maturities of the liabilities are tied to those of the assets. 
 
Despite the positive signs of changes in the funding markets, the concentration of 
medium and long-term debt maturities at the longer term and the absence of refinancing risk  
The bulk of the maturities on 
medium and long-term debt 
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associated with assets securitised by Spanish banks, banks must pay attention to refinancing 
by lengthening maturities as permitted by market conditions. 
 
The international financial crisis has meant drastic changes on wholesale funding markets in 
relation to the situation prevailing in previous years. Spanish deposit institutions, which during 
the extended expansion process, like their European peers, obtained part of the funds 
necessary to sustain the rate of increase in activity on wholesale markets, are having to adapt 
to the new situation. This involves stepping up the amount of savings taken from households 
and non-financial corporations, with the result that the deposit-to-credit ratio has posted 
uninterrupted rises year-on-year since July 2008 (see Chart 2.6.A). 
 
Since summer 2007 until end-2008, the banks have taken deposits at a high rate, posting 
year-on-year growth rates of approximately 10%. This sustained pace of growth in deposit-
taking began to fall off from the beginning of 2009 (see Chart 2.6.B), partly because its rate of 
increase has been continuous and steep in recent years and partly due to the economic 
scenario facing Spanish firms and households. 
 
The group net income of Spanish deposit institutions fell by 18.5% to June 2010 in relation 
to the same period in 2009 (see Table 2.2). The decline in income implies a fall of 15 bp in 
ROA from 0.71% to 0.56% in June 2010 (17 bp, if it is calculated with profit before tax, down 
from 0.94% to 0.77% in June 2010). For its part, ROE has also come under downward 
pressure, decreasing from 12.2% in June 2009 to 9.4% in June 2010. ROE has fallen across 
the board for the banks, although there are differences between them in terms of the level of 
ROE and the sharpness of its decline (see Chart 2.7.A). 
 
Coverage requirements, in terms of average assets, including those arising from foreclosures, 
although they have remained stable, continue to be high. Net interest income, also in terms of 
average assets, fell between June 2009 and June 2010 (see Chart 2.7.B). 
 
maturities as permitted by 
market conditions. 
Spanish institutions have 
continued to increase their 
retail deposit taking … 
… albeit at lower rates than 
in previous months. 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY 
 
The consolidated profit of 
Spanish deposit institutions 
fell in 2010 H1 in year-on-
year terms by 18.5%. 
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Impairment losses, which include specific and general provisioning requirements, have 
posted a year-on-year rate of change of 0.4% in June 2010 (83.3% in June 2009), as a result 
of the lower pace of increase in doubtful assets. Impairment losses on assets other than 
loans and receivables, that reflect the provisions associated with repossessions, grew by 
38.5%, which was also a less steep rate of increase than in previous quarters. Total 
provisions in June 2010 as a percentage of average assets (0.96%) remained at the levels 
recorded in the same period in 2009 (0.96%). Likewise, they subtracted a similar percentage 
from net income as in June 2009 (see Chart 2.7.C). Nevertheless their weight remained high 
and will continue to put downward pressure on income statements in the coming months. 
 
Net interest income fell 17 bp in terms of average assets in June 2010 compared with an increase 
of 29 bp in June 2009 (see Chart 2.7.B). The narrowing of this margin is explained by several 
factors. On the one hand, it is accounted for by the increase in the cost of new time deposits (see 
Chart 2.8.A) in a more competitive environment. On the other, it is due to the changes in activity, to 
the repricing of loans at lower interest rates and to doubtful assets which do not accrue income. 
The foregoing is reflected in a sharper drop in average financial revenue than in average financial 
costs which implies that net interest income fell in the first two quarters of 2010 (see Chart 2.8.B). 
Net interest income, as a percentage of average assets fell across the board for banks’ business in 
Spain (see Chart 2.8.C) but this was not the case for the consolidated business which includes the 
activity of subsidiaries abroad. Banks with a larger international presence slightly increased their net 
interest income (see Chart 2.8.D). In Spain the activity of the largest international groups, which is 
undertaken through subsidiaries and is based on traditional retail banking, has benefited from the 
geographical diversification of risk. 
 
Under these circumstances banks will have to find ways to strengthen income generation and 
to step up their efforts to contain costs. These efforts have already been seen in recent 
quarters. Operating expenses grew 3.5% in June 2010, a lower year-on-year growth rate 
than that posted a year earlier (9.4%). The rate of increase of operating expenses of the  
Impairment losses continue 
to put pressure on income 
statements. 
Net interest income fell in 
the first half of 2010 in 
relation to the same period 
in 2009. 
Banks have begun to 
contain operating costs, 
albeit to a different degree. 
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business in Spain is more modest and stood at 0.1% in year-on-year terms in June 2010 
compared with 1% in June 2009. Spanish banks have gradually been reducing the number of 
their offices since mid-2009 (see Chart 2.9.A). This trend, however, is not even across banks, 
not only because their rates of office closure differ, but because not all of them have the same 
needs to reabsorb excess capacity (see Chart 2.9.B). In any event, containing operating 
costs, in particular for banks showing greater weakness, involves adapting the sector's 
capacity to the new financial situation prevailing in Spain and internationally. It is necessary to 
reduce operating costs because income statements will continue to come under downward 
pressure as a result of provisioning requirements associated with doubtful assets and 
repossessions and due to the narrowing of the net interest margin. 
 
The rise in the cost of wholesale funding associated with the tensions on sovereign debt 
markets has stepped up Spanish institutions' interest in raising new retail deposits. While the 
greater cost of wholesale funding persists for Spanish institutions, financing costs will be 
pressured upwards, in particular owing to the effects of the retail deposit-raising strategies 
pursued in Spain by banks. This pressure will feed through to each bank's margins and to the 
banking system as a whole. Accordingly, banks pursuing these strategies should assess, on 
the basis of their strengths and their profitability, the challenges ahead for them. 
 
To mitigate this pressure, banks should undertake different measures aimed at compensating 
for their forgone profitability (passing on the increase in financing costs and risk premia borne, 
offloading unprofitable assets, improving the quality and quantity of services provided to 
customers, etc.), improving their operational efficiency (reducing and optimising unit operating 
costs) and enhancing the credit quality of their portfolios (making for lesser future write-down 
requirements). 
 
should be stepped up to 
cushion the impact of 
negative factors on the 
income statement. 
The strategy to raise retail 
deposits should be 
accompanied by a 
bolstering of the cost-cutting 
policy and by increased 
efficiency, along with active 
bank balance sheet 
management. 
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Nonetheless, in the case of institutions that have received public funds from the FROB, 
particular prudence will be called for when pursuing retail deposit-raising strategies precisely 
because of the public support received, and it will be necessary to speed through their 
integration and restructuring plans. 
 
A comparison between the earnings of the largest Spanish banks in the first half of 2010 and those 
of their European competitors shows that, as in recent years, the former were more profitable 
(see Chart 2.10.A). Despite the relatively favourable position of Spanish banks with respect to their 
European competitors in terms of profitability, market indicators show that 2010 is proving to be 
difficult (see Chart 2.10.B). However, it should also be taken into account that while in 2008 and 
In comparison with their 
European peers, the largest 
Spanish banks posted 
favourable earnings in 2010 
H1. 
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Jun-10Jun-09
 DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER
 WELFARE AND OTHER SPANISH FUNDS
 REVALUATION RESERVES
 CORRECTION TO VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS
 GEN. PROV. AND AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF EXPECTED LOSSES
 SUBORDINATED DEBT AND SIMILAR INSTRUMENTS
 RATE OF CHANGE
%
D. TIER 2 CAPITAL. CONTRIBUTION TO RATE
OF CHANGE (left-hand panel) AND COMPOSITION
(right-hand panel)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Weights. Jun 10
%
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Jun-10Jun-09
 OTHER DEDUCTIONS
 GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS
 PREF. AND NON-VOTING SHARES AND OTHER SPANISH INSTRUMENTS
 RESERVES
 CAPITAL
 RATE OF CHANGE
%
C. TIER 1 CAPITAL. CONTRIBUTION TO RATE
OF CHANGE (left-hand panel) AND COMPOSITION
(right-hand panel)
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Weights. Jun 10
%
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Jun-10Jun-09
 DEDUCTIONS
 OTHER
 TIER 2
 TIER 1
 RATE OF CHANGE
%
B. OWN FUNDS. CONTRIBUTION TO RATE
OF CHANGE (left-hand panel) AND COMPOSITION
(right-hand panel)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Jun-10Jun-09
 TEMPORARY AND OTHER RISKS
 OPERATIONAL RISK
 MARKET AND CURRENCY RISKS
 SETTLEMENT RISK
 CREDIT, COUNTERPART, DILUTION AND DELIVERY RISKS
 RATE OF CHANGE. REQUIREMENTS
A. REQUIREMENTS. CONTRIBUTION TO RATE
OF CHANGE (left-hand panel) AND COMPOSITION
(right-hand panel)
%
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Weights. Jun 10
%
0
20
40
60
80
100
Weights. Jun 10
%
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND OWN FUNDS
Deposit institutions
CHART 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA   37   FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, OCTOBER 2010 
 
2009 the stock market performance of the largest European banks was very poor, that of the 
Spanish banks was even more favourable following the intensification of the financial crisis in 
September 2008. The CDS spreads of Spanish banks have fallen, although they are still higher 
than those of their European counterparts (see Chart 2.10.B).  
 
Spanish deposit institutions have again, on the whole, shown robust solvency ratios in June 
2010. The overall solvency ratio reached 11.8%, up 10 bp from mid-2009, while the tier 1 
ratio reached 9.6%, up 60 bp from a year earlier (see Chart 2.11.A). At the same time, the 
core capital ratio (capital and reserves, net of goodwill, as a proportion of capital 
requirements) also increased by 50 bp, rising from 7.5% to 8% over the last twelve months. 
The disaggregated analysis shows that the increase in solvency also occurred in a number of 
institutions (see Chart 2.11.B). 
 
This strength in the solvency ratios puts Spanish banks in a favourable position to meet the 
stricter requirements of Basel III (see Chapter 3), especially taking into account that the 
increase in solvency in June is explained by the fact that the rise in risk-weighted assets was 
more than offset by the strengthening of own funds, especially top quality own funds. 
 
The growth rate of risk-weighted assets, the denominator of the solvency ratio, slowed by 
82 bp to 2% in June 2010, against a background of lending restraint (see Chart 2.12.A). 
Credit risk requirements, those with by far the greatest weight, remained practically 
unchanged from the previous year, with growth of 0.7%, while the other requirements 
recorded stronger growth rates. Depending on whether institutions used the standardised or 
IRB approach in their calculations credit risk performed differently. Thus, while the 
requirements obtained from using the standardised approach, whose weight in total 
requirements was 63% in June 2010, decreased 1.4%, the risk requirements under the IRB 
method increased by 4.3%. 
 
Total own funds grew at a year-on-year rate of 3.1% in June 2010. This was attributable to 
the growth of tier 1 capital (8.7% in June 2010), and in particular retained earnings, which 
offset the increase in deductions and the decline in tier 2 capital (see Chart 2.12.B). The 
2.1.3 SOLVENCY 
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capital. 
Risk weighted assets grew 
in June 2010... 
… but own funds, especially 
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growth of tier 1 capital, in spite of the slowdown in eligible capital (to 2.6%, from 23.2% in 
June 2009), is explained by the favourable behaviour of reserves, which grew by 12.5% (twice 
the rate a year earlier), and, to a lesser extent, issuance of preference shares (which grew by 
5%); (see Chart 2.12.C). The decline in tier 2 capital moderated as a consequence of a 
smaller fall in general provisions and corrections to valuation adjustments (see Chart 2.12.D). 
 
The largest Spanish banks have capital ratios that are around the median of those of their 
European competitors (see Chart 2.13.A). In terms of leverage – understood as the banks’ 
accounting own funds as a proportion of their total assets – Spanish institutions are in a 
favourable position relative to the largest European institutions (see Chart 2.13.B). 
 
The European insurance sector is currently subject to similar pressures to those mentioned in 
the last FSR, which have actually been present since 2008. First, the difficulties associated 
with financial market developments remain. Second, the real economy is still showing signs of 
weakness, which is having a negative impact on insurance companies, especially in certain 
segments. 
 
In Spain, the sector is also affected by financial risks, although to a lesser extent, as already 
argued in previous FSRs (owing to the low weight of equity holdings and real estate exposure), 
and by the adverse economic situation. The information available on the second quarter of 
20102 indicates that, in the sector as a whole, premiums grew at a negative year-on-year rate 
of 5.2%, as against a negative rate of 3.7% in the previous quarter. In the life segment 
premiums fell by 10%, although managed savings grew by 2.9%. The non-life segment, 
which has recorded negative year-on-year growth rates in recent quarters, grew by -1% in 
the second quarter. In the case of non-life premiums, 36% are attributable to the automobile 
segment, which continued to record negative growth in the three months to June 2010 (-1%). 
Multirisk business, associated with mortgage loans and health, which in total represents 20% 
of premium volume, recorded positive growth (of 2% and 4.2%, respectively), while the other 
non-life segments declined at a year-on-year rate of 7.1%.  
 
2. ICEA data. 
The capital ratios of the 
largest Spanish banks stand 
at the average of those of 
their European competitors. 
2.2 Insurance companies, 
investment funds and 
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Following a relatively favourable performance in the second half of 2009, the international 
financial markets experienced significant strains in 2010, especially in the second quarter. 
This had an impact on the assets of investment funds, not only due to pressures on returns, 
but also, and fundamentally, because net subscriptions declined again. Apart from financial 
market developments, in a setting that is still complicated by bouts of stress that may 
dissuade investors owing to a higher perception of risk, investment funds will face greater 
competition from the banks for the savings of households and firms (see Charts 2.14.A and 
2.14.B). 
The assets of investment 
funds were again under 
pressure, especially owing 
to the net withdrawal of 
funds. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA   40   FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, OCTOBER 2010 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA   41   FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, OCTOBER 2010 
 
3   Other issues 
 
 
 
Progress in international financial regulation is proving intense. Notable headway has been 
made by the Basel Banking Supervision Committee, which has agreed to what has become 
known as Basel III. The first part of this chapter focuses on this. The second part addresses 
the reform of the legal regime for savings banks, an enormously important development. 
 
The BIS Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHoS), the body to which the Basel 
Committee reports, agreed on 12 July 2010 on the general design of the reform of the capital 
and liquidity regulations (Basel III). The key features of the reform are the definition of capital, 
the treatment of counterparty risk and the inclusion of a leverage ratio and a liquidity standard 
(the definition of the capital buffers will be finalised at the end of the year). On 12 September, 
GHoS agreed on the capital proposals and on the timetable for the implementation of the 
new measures.   
 
Regarding the definition of capital, it was decided that minority interests in bank subsidiaries 
could be partly included in common equity (capital plus reserves less deductions). In the case 
of deferred tax assets from timing differences and of significant investments in unconsolidated 
financial institutions, it was proposed that, contrary to their full deduction from common 
equity as set out in the December document, an allowance subject to an individual and 
aggregate limit be set so that only the amount in excess of this allowance were deducted. 
The individual limit is set at 10% of common equity, and the aggregate limit at 15%. 
 
As to the measurement of counterparty credit risk, the July resolution amends the 
consultative document, reducing the calibration and making the simple method proposed to 
calculate capital requirements to cover the so-called credit valuation adjustment more risk-
sensitive. Elsewhere, the proposal to increase capital requirements for credit risk to interbank 
exposures to large entities, defined as those with total assets exceeding $100 billion ($25 
billion in the previous proposal), has been maintained.  
 
The Committee agreed on the design and calibration for the leverage ratio, which will serve as 
the basis for testing during the trial period. Final design and calibration have been postponed 
until 2017, once the functioning of this ratio and its interaction with the risk-based 
requirement has been analysed. The ratio has been designed with a view to becoming a 
requirement under Pillar 1 in January 2018, once it has been duly revised and calibrated. To 
conduct this analysis, there was agreement on a definition of the ratio using Tier 1 capital as a 
numerator (although the impact of using total regulatory capital and common equity will also 
be analysed) and, as a denominator, an exposure value that softens the treatment proposed 
in the consultative document for certain items and accepts Basel II netting for derivatives and 
repos. The proposed calibration during the trial period is 3%.  
 
Turning to the measures set out in the December consultative document to lessen 
procyclicality, the Committee has maintained the design of the capital conservation buffer and 
has issued for consultation a countercyclical buffer proposal, whose final design will be 
published at the end of the year following the public consultation stage. The Committee is 
likewise analysing measures to reduce the excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital 
requirements and is in discussions with accounting standard-setters concerning the best 
means of including accounting provisions based on expected losses in the regulations; at the 
The calibration of the Basel 
III capital proposals and the 
timetable for implementation 
of the attendant measures, 
which in some instances 
have been amended since 
July, were agreed on 12 
September. 
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same time, the Committee continues to study the specific treatment that should be given to 
systemic banks.   
 
GHoS also agreed on amendments to the December 2009 document on liquidity standards. 
In the case of the short-term ratio, whose aim is to cover foreseeable fund outflows over a 
stressed one-month period, the stress scenario has been eased and the definition of liquid 
assets broadened. Regarding the structural ratio, work has not yet finished. The Committee is 
expected to have a revised ratio ready by December 2010.  As with the leverage ratio, the 
effects of the ratio be assessed over an observation period, its design will be revised and it 
will be set as a minimum standard in January 2018. 
 
At its September meeting, GHoS agreed on the calibration of the new measures. The 
minimum common equity requirement was set at 4.5%, that for tier 1 capital at 6% and 
that for total regulatory capital at 8%. The calibration for the capital conservation buffer was 
also established, at 2.5% of common equity. The capital buffer is designed for use in 
periods of stress, so that banks may absorb the losses incurred and remain above the 
minimum requirements. While the capital conservation buffer is not fully covered, banks will 
have restrictions on profit distribution (whether by dividend distribution or variable 
remuneration to their employees), which will be all the greater the smaller the buffer they 
have set up.   
 
Calibration of the countercyclical buffer, which is only applicable at times of excessively 
expanding credit, has set its maximum at 2.5%. The type of capital needed to cover this 
buffer has not yet been defined.   
 
The new package of capital and liquidity measures will come into force on 1 January 2013, 
but a timetable has been set for their gradual implementation which, in the case of the capital 
measures, should be fully in place by 1 January 2019. The short-term liquidity ratio will be 
introduced on 1 January 2015, and the structural liquidity ratio on 1 January 2018.  
 
The main points of the recent reform of the legal regime governing savings banks, 
approved pursuant to Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010 on governing bodies and 
other aspects of the legal regime for savings banks, are as follows:1 
 
 To provide for their access to capital markets, so they may issue core capital 
instruments.   
 To contribute to making their management and governing bodies more professional. 
 To subject savings banks to effective market discipline. 
 
The new regulations seek to resolve the shortcomings in the capitalisation alternatives open 
to savings banks in two ways: though the creation of equity units with voting rights and by 
paving the way for new models through which to pursue their business. That will enable them 
to better face the greater solvency requirements arising from Basel III.  
 
By being able to issue equity units with voting rights, savings banks can readily opt to 
continue pursuing their business in the traditional manner and raise top-quality capital on the 
market. The main changes in their legal regime are:  
 
 
1. Errata (Official State Gazette of 17 July 2010). Validated by Parliament through the Resolution dated 21 July 2010. The 
Upper House has formulated a series of amendments that could change the text currently in force.  
Minimum requirements of 
4.5%, 6% and 8% have 
been set for common equity, 
tier 1 capital and total 
capital, respectively, along 
with a conservation buffet at 
2.5% of common equity. 
The entry into force of the 
measures will be gradual.  
The new savings bank 
legislation provides for … 
…the issuance of equity 
units with voting rights … 
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 For the first time, equity units allow their holders to participate in the governing bodies of 
the issuing institution, in proportion to their share in the total net worth. The ceiling on the 
volume of equity units in circulation is maintained (it may not exceed 50% of the saving 
bank’s equity), but the limit on the holding of equity units by a holder (5% of the units in 
circulation to date) is eliminated. The regime governing significant holdings in credit 
institutions2 will be applicable to the equity units.  
 The principle of freedom of issuance is applicable, but not the regime governing takeover 
bids. 
 
The text paves the way for savings banks to pursue their activity using new models, thereby 
responding to the initiatives of those institutions with a business outlook that extends beyond 
their traditional markets and businesses. There are three alternatives here: 
 
 Integration into an Institutional Protection System (IPS). The reform does not create the 
model, but rather reinforces it by attributing to the Banco de España the competence to 
assess, prior to a savings bank exiting the system, the viability of the bank and that of the 
other participants following the rupture. Further, in IPSs involving savings banks, the 
central institution will be a public limited company in which they have at least a 50% 
share. 
 To assign all financial business to a commercial bank controlled by the savings bank, 
holding at least 50% of its capital, and retaining savings bank status. In the event of a 
loss of control, the following alternative shall be used. 
 Conversion into a foundation that segregates financial activities from social and welfare-
related activities, thereby assigning its business as a credit institution to a commercial 
bank in which it has a holding.  
 
Participation by new interest groups in governance structures will pave the way for the use of 
more professional and independent management criteria. Further, it will reduce the maximum 
weight of public-sector powers in the governing bodies from 50% at present to a maximum 
of 40% of total votes; positions as elected politicians and senior public-sector officials will be 
incompatible with membership of savings banks’ governing bodies; greater professionalism 
and experience will be required of the members of governing bodies; higher majorities will be 
set for the adoption of fundamental resolutions, and all savings banks shall be obliged to 
publish annually a corporate governance report, a demand hitherto only made of those that 
had issued tradeable securities on official markets.  
 
All these reforms entail subjecting these institutions to greater market discipline, in respect in 
any event of their social role and function. The actual exercise of market discipline will 
contribute to enhancing the soundness and solvency of the savings bank sector, and 
therefore of the entire Spanish banking system. This will improve the outlook for and 
competitive position of savings banks, providing for the flow of credit towards the productive 
economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Title VI of Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988 on the Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions. 
… the pursuit of activity 
through new business 
models … 
… and management 
improvements. 
Further to all these changes, 
savings banks will be more 
subject to market discipline. 
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